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The development of the unemployment rate differs substantially between OECD countries. In
recent years some countries experienced a mild increase, other countries had a stable
unemployment rate, while there are also ‘successful’ countries in which the unemployment rate
decreased a lot.  A common feature of the successful countries is that they implemented a
comprehensive set of institutional reforms. In this paper we present a theoretical and empirical
framework to investigate how unemployment is affected by different labour market institutions
(LMI) such as labour taxes, unemployment benefits, employment protection, union bargaining
power and (de)centralisation of bargaining. We argue that complementarities between LMI can be
exploited to improve labour market performance. In our empirical analysis of annual data over the
period 1960-1995 of eighteen OECD countries we show that interactions between LMI are indeed
important.
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1. INTRODUCTION
There are substantial differences in the development of the unemployment rate
between OECD countries. In North America, unemployment has an important
cyclical component.  There is a slight positive trend since the beginning of the
1970s.  Unemployment rate has peaked at just 9.5 percent in the 1980s.  It is
currently around 7 percent and it is globally stable since the beginning of the
1990s.  By contrast, unemployment in the European Union and in Oceania has
risen sharply since the mid-1970s, appearing to be more structural than in the
United States. The EFTA countries experienced an exceptionally stable
unemployment rate until the end of the eighties.  However, since then,
unemployment has risen sharply to almost 8 percent.  In Japan, the unemployment
rate has always been much lower, between 1 and 3 percent.
Within this context of globally rising or at most stabilising unemployment rates,
in recent years some countries have managed to reduce their unemployment rates
substantially.  Indeed, according to 1999 “OECD in Figures” and “Employment
Outlook”, some encouraging developments were registered in the United
Kingdom (12% in 1986, 6,2% in 1998), Ireland (17,8% in 1987, 7,7 in 1998), the
Netherlands (12,2% in 1984, 4,2% in 1998) and New Zealand (10,3% in 1991,
7,5% in 1998)
4.
It could be that some countries have a better labour market performance than
other countries because they have a particular type of institutions or they changed
some of institutions in a favourable way (see Nickell and Layard (1999) for a
general overview and Nickell and Van Ours (2000a, 2000b) for an explanation of
the success of The Netherlands and UK in reducing unemployment). If this is the
case, then countries with high unemployment rates could learn from successful
countries by imitation. However, as Freeman (1998) stresses, countries cannot
just borrow some features from successful countries and expect the
unemployment rate to decline since a particular institutional feature may perform
differently depending on the overall institutional framework.
Institutions interact with each other, i.e. the institutional framework is not a set
of independent elements. Calmfors (1993) shows how the effect of taxes can
theoretically differ according to nature of the bargaining institutions. Coe and
Snower (1997) argue that a wide range of labour market institutions have
complementary effects on unemployment. They also point that if institutions
interact with each other, policies also do.  So it might be possible that some
countries exploited policy complementarities and hence reduced their
unemployment rates more than others did.  Fitoussi et. al. (1998) underline that all
recently successful countries have in common the implementation of a set of
comprehensive reforms.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the existence of complementarities
in more detail.  We present a theoretical model that enables us to illustrate the
mechanisms through which institutions interact and influence unemployment. We
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also investigate whether there is empirical evidence on the existence of
complementarities.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present a theoretical model
of employment and wage determination. In section 3, we discuss the labour
market performances of OECD countries and relate these in a stylised way to
labour market institutions.  In section 4, we present our empirical analysis based
on eighteen OECD countries, over the period 1960-1995.  Section 5 concludes.
2. LABOUR MARKET AND INSTITUTIONS, THEORY
In this section, we study the way institutions affect the labour markets in the
context of the well-known right-to-manage model of wage bargaining.  The
institutions concern variables such as the labour taxes, firing costs, unemployment
benefit system, and the degree of co-ordination and centralisation in the
bargaining process.  We investigate the direct effect of these institutions, but also
consider their interactions, and show the existence of complementarities and
rivalries.
2.1. Right-to-manage model of wage bargaining
We start our analysis by extending the traditional right-to-manage model of
wage bargaining (Nickell and Andrews (1983)). The basic idea of a right-to-
manage model is that wages are set by a bargaining between a union and a firm,
and  employment is managed by the firm alone, after wages are set.  The wages
are set so as to maximise the relative rents of both actors. We follow closely the
line of reasoning in Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) and Booth (1995).
In our model, the economy is constituted of n perfectly symmetric firms
(i=1,2,...n) and n unions. Each of the unions negotiates wages in one firm and
bargains independently of the other unions. The case where n = 1 represents the
situation in which wage negotiations are centralised.
Firms will decide on the level of employment given the negotiated wage. We
assume that the actors are perfectly informed on the firm’s behaviour, in
particular on the labour demand function. Since bargaining occurs before, the
actors consider the level of employment in the firm as endogenous in the
bargaining process. The first logical step consists in describing the firm’s
behaviour.
We assume that the firms produce a differentiated product. We characterise
them by their degree of monopoly power on the product market h ˛ [0,1]
5. The
reason why we introduce product differentiation is related to the wage bargaining
process.  We want to allow for various bargaining processes, i.e. at the firm-level,
at the industry-level and at the central-level (defined by n = 1).  Firm-level and
industry-level bargaining are distinguished according to their degree of monopoly
power on the product market.  We make the following assumptions. If bargaining
occurs at the firm-level, h is considered to be 0, while if bargaining occurs at the
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industry-level, h is supposed to be higher.  Indeed, what matters for the firms
while negotiating is the degree of competition they face with firms not negotiating
with them.  At the industry-level, competition with firms of other industries is
smaller.
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where r is the exogenous discount rate, wi,t the negotiated (net) wage which is
exogenous to the employment decision of the firm, t the labour tax rate and  wi,tf
are the firing costs per worker the firm has to incur at the end of the period.
The first order condition are:
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Equation (2.6) shows that employment depends negatively on the net wage, the
firing costs, the labour tax, the degree of monopoly power and positively on
labour intensity.  The latter parameter also determines the price mark-up over the
wage and can therefore also be seen as an indicator of monopoly power.
Consequently, we define the effective degree of monopoly power as m = 1-a(1-h).
The degree of monopoly power determines the importance of the price mark-up5
on wage costs. The higher it is the lower is the employment level required to
reach the optimum profit.
With respect to the bargaining process, we assume the following chronology in
decisions (Cahuc and Zylberberg (1994)):
1. At the beginning of the period t, wage bargaining takes place. In case of
failure, workers are fired immediately. They get a chance of being employed
in another firm or are unemployed for that period at least.
2. When a wage agreement has been reached, firms start producing and paying
wages. When the bargaining procedure failed, firms do not produce
anything.
3. At the end of the period t, firms incur costs associated with firing or
adjustments. Workers who have been employed get a share of these firing
costs.
We have already described how the firm was going to choose the employment
level, given the wage.  The wage is fixed in a bargaining process, where the actors
are perfectly informed about firm behavioural mechanisms. The idea is that the
actors negotiate a wage so maximising their respective rents, corresponding to the
difference in utilities with and without agreement (bargaining failure). We assume
that both actors are risk neutral, i.e. their expected utility corresponds exactly to
the expected monetary payments and costs they incur.
Before specifying the respective rents of both actors, we define the expected
utilities of an unemployed worker and of a worker in firm i.
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where b  is the nominal unemployment benefit, applying to all unemployed,
whatever their history and situation is. Li,t+1 is the employment level
6 in firm i, in
period t+1 and Wi,t+1 is the utility of working in firm i in period t+1. The expected
utility of the unemployed worker is equal to the sum of the present gains of being
unemployed (unemployment benefit) and the future gains in utility. The latter
depends on the future situation of the unemployed. Since all individuals are
identical, we know that all the members of the labour force face the same
probability of being employed at the next period, in one firm. With a
complementary probability, they will not find a job in any firm and stay
unemployed.
Wi,t, the expected utility of a worker in firm i in period t is defined as follows :
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6 We assume a constant labour force, which we normalise to one, so the employment level
corresponds to the probability of being employed in that firm.6
where wi,t is the bargained nominal wage in firm i. The worker receives a
proportion q (q>0) of the firing costs incurred by the firm at the end of the period.
The expected future is the same for everyone, so the second term in (2.8) is the
same as in (2.7).
We now consider the utility of the unions. The unions represent the entire labour
force. Assuming risk neutrality, the utility of a union is equal to the expected
utility of a representative member. The question is: what can a representative
member expect at the beginning of the bargaining process? First, there are two
possibilities with respect to the bargaining process itself, since it may lead to a
wage agreement or it can fail. We assume that in case of bargaining failure,
nobody is hired. Second, if an agreement is concluded, the individual union
member is still uncertain about whether he is going to be employed or not, and if
he does, in what firm he will be working. We assume that the unions maximise
the difference in their utilities in case of agreement and in case of failure.
First, let us consider the expected utility in case of agreement. We should keep
in mind that the unions are firm specific but represent the entire labour force.
What can happen to a representative member of the firm union i?  He can either
be employed in that firm (with probability Li,t) or not (with probability (1-Li,t)).  If
he is not employed in that firm, he can either be employed by another firm (with
probability  ￿
„i j
t j L , ) or be unemployed (with probability (1- ￿
„i j
t j L , ). From the point
of view of a particular union, the probability of being employed in another firm is
given.
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It is obvious that in the centralised case, there is not such other firm where
workers can possibly apply.  In the absence of alternative employment, the term
Ait, reduces to Ut.
Now we turn to the fallback position of the representative worker. If an
agreement is not reached, we assume that the worker still has a chance to be
employed in another firm. The default option is unemployment. The fallback
position of a representative worker in firm i is therefore defined as :
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In case of failure, the labour demand in firm i is equal to 0 and therefore, the
only options for the worker are to find a job in another firm (and be hired with
probability Lj,t ) or stay unemployed. In the centralised case, the fallback position
is Ut.
The rents of the union are consequently defined as follows :7
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Expression (2.11) shows that the unions care about employment in the firm they
represent and about the relative welfare of a worker in firm i.  The latter depends
on the value of working in the given firm and on the alternatives (working in
another firm or being unemployed).
In the centralised case, the union rents can be expressed as:
). ( , , , t t i t i t i U W L UR - = (2.12)
This expression results from the absence of alternatives other than
unemployment both in case of non-employment in firm i and of bargaining
failure.
By substituting for Wi,t, Wj,t, and Ut, we get :
. , ) 1 ( , , i b qf w U W t i t t i " - + = - (2.13)
The difference between the value of working in firm i and being unemployed
corresponds to the difference in the present monetary gains associated with these
two events.  The terms valuing the future are indeed equal in both situations since
all the members of the labour force (employed and unemployed) end up in the
same pool at the beginning of the next period.  Labour market histories do not
matter for the future.
We finally need to define the rents of the firm. We assume that in case of
bargaining failure, there is no production and nobody is hired. However, the firm
still expects a profit in the future. The rents of the firm are equal to :
t i t i t i t i t i L f w Y F P FR , , , , , ) 1 ( ) ( + + - = t (2.14)
We assume Nash bargaining :
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where b is the respective bargaining power of the union in firm i.
We can directly plug the expressions for the union rents and the firm rents in the
Nash bargaining
7 to find the following expression for the wage in firm i :
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This immediately shows that the wage in firm i is set as a mark-up on the
alternative incomes (wage in the other firm and unemployment benefit).  It is also
clear that this mark up depends on institutional parameters.
We derive the general equilibrium wage level by using the symmetry condition
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t  ).  In figure 1, we represent them in a two-dimension space
(Lt,wt).
Ultimately, equilibrium wage and employment are exclusively determined by
(institutional) parameters (c).
Hence, the equilibrium employment in a centralised economy is:
                                               
8 See appendix 1.
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Lt The effect of a firing cost is ambiguous.
Equation 2.19 shows that employment is depressed by the union bargaining
power, by the effective degree of monopoly power, by the labour tax rate and by
the unemployment benefit.  The effect of the firing costs is ambiguous.
The union bargaining power, the number of unions, the degree of product
monopoly power, the unemployment benefit and the firing costs act directly on
the bargaining position of the worker. The higher the first four parameters and the
lower the last one the most favourable is the bargaining position of the worker. It
is pretty obvious for the bargaining power itself. For the rest, the number of
unions and the unemployment benefit influence the bargaining position by
defining the alternative to work, and the degree of product monopoly power by
determining the surplus to be shared.
The labour tax rate, the firing cost and the degree of monopoly power also
reduce labour demand, for reasons already mentioned before.
Let us remark that the degree of monopoly power acts on both sides (labour
demand and bargaining position) and is pushing the unemployment rate upwards
by these two mechanisms: pushing the wages up and reducing the labour demand
for any wage. On the other hand, the firing costs, also acting on both sides of the
market, activate two mechanisms in opposite directions. They are a form of
substitute to wage compensation and therefore push the equilibrium wage
downwards, but they also constitute a cost for the firm and reduce the labour
demand. The total effect is therefore ambiguous.
This framework is designed to feature multiple bargaining systems. Ceteris
paribus, firm-level bargaining (n large, h = 0) is associated with a higher level of
employment than industry-level bargaining (n large, h ﬁ1).  Centralised
bargaining (n = 1) always leads to relatively low wages.
2.2. Complementarities
We have already described the expected effects of institutional reforms.
Equation (2.19) implies that the influence of one particular parameter on the
equilibrium level of the economy depends crucially on the rest of the institutional
framework. The point is that any parameter depressing the level of employment
also depresses the adjustment of employment to an institutional reform. For
example, the effectiveness of a tax reform might be moderated by strong unions
or a generous unemployment benefit system.10
Institutions interact with each other, i.e. their effect on the equilibrium
employment rate depend on each other. Two institutions are complementary when
in a particular institutional framework, the effect of one of them is reinforced by
the other.
We can distinguish three types of parameters. First, there are parameters
indicating exclusively the bargaining position of the workers: n, b, b.  The lower
they are, the lower is the equilibrium wage and the larger labour demand. By
pushing the wage up, they reduce the labour demand and reduce its sensibility to
institutional reforms. Second, there is the tax rate that affects directly labour
demand. Taxes also introduce a cost in adjusting the labour demand to wages. The
higher these taxes, the smaller labour demand’s response to the wage.  Hence, for
a reform to be effective, low taxes are better. Finally, there are parameters
affecting labour demand and the bargaining position of the union: the firing costs
(f) and the degree of monopoly power (m). Firing costs reduce labour demand
(and so its response to the wage changes) but also push the wage downwards (sort
of substitution with wage). So the total effect on employment is ambiguous.
Firing costs also interact ambiguously with the rest of the institutions. When
considered as a factor affecting the bargaining position, its effect is larger the
larger the other parameters. When considered as a factor reducing the labour
demand, the lower the other parameters, the larger the negative effect of the firing
costs. So there is an obvious ambiguous effect with respect to the firing costs.
The degree of monopoly power determines the bargaining position of the worker
in a positive way. It therefore also reduces labour demand’s response to the wage.
However the degree of monopoly power also reduces labour demand (and its
response). So its effects are larger the smaller the parameters of the first group
and the lower the taxes.
Since institutional frameworks vary strongly across countries, similar
institutional reforms will have very different effects on the unemployment rate.
Some reforms are implemented not only because of their direct favourable effect
on the unemployment rate but also because of their interaction with other future
reforms, whose effectiveness would then be enhanced.
Therefore, we conclude that the clever design of a labour market reform could
lie in the exploitation of these complementarities.
3. INSTITUTIONS AND LABOUR MARKETS IN OECD COUNTRIES
In our theoretical model, we use a number of variables to reflect the institutional
framework. In this section, we describe what indicators we use to represent the
institutions in our empirical analysis.  We also present some stylised facts of the
labour markets in OECD countries and relate them in a qualitative way to
institutions and their evolution over time.
The theoretical model suggests that the unemployment rate depends on various
institutional parameters, which we proxy by variables
9 in the following way.
Union bargaining power is proxied by union density, monopoly power and degree
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of centralisation by indicators on the degree of co-ordination between the
bargaining actors and the degree of centralisation (or union coverage) of the
economy (privileged level of bargaining: firm, industry or national). As an
indicator for labour taxes, we use the sum of the direct tax rate and the
employment tax rate, measuring the fiscal pressure respectively on workers and
employers.
The generosity of the unemployment benefit system is proxied by a summary
indicator of the replacement rate, averaging the replacement rates in various time,
family and working conditions.
Firing costs are proxied by three types of employment protection indicators:
protection of open-ended contracts, restrictions on the use of fixed-term contracts
and restrictions on the use of temporary work agencies.  We have built these three
indexes by a method described in the appendix 3, consisting in grading
regulations in the field of working contracts.
We introduce the change in inflation as the driving macroeconomic variable (cfr.
Nickell, 1998), so as to explain deviations of the unemployment rate from its
natural non-accelerating level.
We now turn to the description of the evolution of labour markets in OECD
countries and their relation with institutions. When we look at the evolution of
unemployment rates over time in OECD countries (Table 1), we distinguish three
groups
10. The first group (successful) is the one of countries succeeding in
reducing the unemployment rate, after having experienced a significant increase.
These are Australia, Denmark, Ireland, The Netherlands, New Zealand and
United-Kingdom. We also note that the dates of success vary across countries.
The success of Australia, Denmark and New Zealand is recent, while Ireland, The
Netherlands and United Kingdom are showing signs of increasing performance
since more than a decade. The second group (unsuccessful) we distinguish is the
one still on a path of increasing unemployment rates: Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland.  The increases in unemployment rates
are not occurring simultaneously. The Scandinavian countries are concerned by a
significant change only in the late eighties, beginning nineties, so as Switzerland.
The unemployment rate is on the other hand continuously increasing since the
beginning of the seventies in countries such as Belgium, France, Germany and
Italy, the group of “continental” European countries. Our third group (stable)
consists of countries that stabilised their unemployment rate after having
experienced a significant increase (Canada and Norway) or countries that never
experienced any big significant disturbance on its labour market: Austria, Japan
and USA. The standard deviation of their unemployment rate is indeed very
small.
Now, let’s turn to the institutions as potential determinants of the recent
developments. What we want to know is if there is any relationship between
institutions and the development of the unemployment rates.  In this respect,
differences between countries may be caused by time invariant differences in
institutions or by the differences in the evolution of institutions.
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We look at the important dates in each country, i.e. dates showing important
changes in the labour market. For all the groups, we start with year 1960 and
finish with year 1996.  For all countries with rising unemployment, we point out
the year where the unemployment rate significantly increased.  For the successful
countries, we point in addition the year when the unemployment rate was the
highest. For countries with a stable unemployment rate, we choose arbitrarily the
year 1985 as additional reference.
First of all, it is interesting to look at cross-sectional differences in institutional
frameworks, comparing the averages of indicators for different institutions (Table
2). At first sight, the grouping of countries does not correspond clearly to a
grouping of institutions. There is apparently no straight link between institutions
and unemployment at the level of the four groups of countries. Still, we can
sketch out some interesting patterns.
The group of “unsuccessful countries” is characterised by a relatively high tax
burden, Switzerland being the only exception. The other three groups have a
relatively low tax burden, with the exception of The Netherlands and Austria.
What is surprising is that the countries that managed to reduce their
unemployment rates over the last decade are also having relatively high
replacement rates on average, the only exception being Australia.  Further, we see
clearly that the group of unsuccessful countries has relatively high labour
standards (existence of a minimum wage and employment regulation).
Concerning the employment regulation indicator, it is also remarkable to see that
all successful countries, without exception, have a more flexible employment
regulation that the other countries.  The group of unsuccessful countries is
dominated by a medium level of centralisation and co-ordination, Finland and
Sweden being important exceptions.  Some countries with a medium degree of
centralisation appear to be better performing, but they all present a relatively high
degree of co-ordination.  Furthermore, most of the non-successful countries have
a relatively high union coverage.  Some high-union-coverage-countries are in the
other groups but we note that in these cases, the union density is also high, while
in the unsuccessful groups, three countries (Italy, France, Germany) present huge
differences between the union density and the union coverage. Finally, it appears
that the unsuccessful group is relatively more open than the rest.
This descriptive information on cross-sectional differences between institutions
does not tell the whole story.  However, it is still interesting to see that there are
some common features among the countries experiencing the same evolution,
even though the evolution we consider relates to the last decade, while the
features relate to the last forty years.
Averages of institutional indicators can however be misleading because they do
not tell anything about the evolution of institutions. That’s why we look at the
institutions at crucial turning points in the evolution of the unemployment rates of
the 18 OECD countries (Tables 3, 4 and 5).
Let us first look at the group of unsuccessful countries. It seems that the increase
in unemployment rate is associated with an increase in tax burden, employment
protection of open-ended contracts, union coverage and union density,
Switzerland being an exception for the two latter.  Most of the countries engaged
in a process of reforming the regulation of fixed term contracts in a more flexible13
way, but this was combined with a reinforcement of the protection of traditional
open-ended contracts.  Finland and Sweden, the two Scandinavian countries of
the group were centralised at the beginning of the sixties.  Their centralisation
level has decreased over time.  Now, they both conclude more agreements on the
industry level.  We also see that Sweden has experienced an additional drop in its
co-ordination level.
Regarding the group of successful countries, most of them experienced a
reduction in their tax burden at the crucial point starting from where their
unemployment rates went down.  Not much happened in the employment
regulation, except  that the protection of open-ended contracts was reduced in the
Netherlands, while United kingdom is the only country reinforcing it in its
successful period. When considering the changes occurred in the “successful
period” only, i.e. between the year of the highest unemployment rate and today,
we see that most of the countries have changed many institutions at once,
combining a reduction in tax burden, replacement rate, union density and union
coverage.  Australia, The Netherlands, New Zealand and United Kingdom also
reformed their bargaining system, although in different ways: Australia, towards a
low centralised and a weakly co-ordinated system, the Netherlands towards
increased co-ordination between unions and employers’ organisations (cfr.
Agreement of “Wassenaar”), New Zealand switched from an industry-level
bargaining system to a firm-level system, so did United Kingdom. The
Netherlands and United Kingdom changed in addition their labour standards, the
Netherlands by relaxing its employment protection regulation in all respects
(open-ended contracts, fixed term contracts and temporary work agencies), while
United Kingdom suppressed the minimum wage in 1993.  These two countries are
the most obvious examples of “comprehensive” reforms implemented in their
labour markets.
When we look at the two countries that experienced an increase in their
unemployment rate, that then stabilised (Canada and Norway) went through
opposite changes in union density (went up) and union coverage (went down).
Norway reduced slightly the tax burden, while Canada increased both the tax
burden and the replacement rate.   Canada has a decentralised bargaining system,
while Norway is one example of a highly centralised and co-ordinated country.
Countries that did not experience important disturbances in their labour markets
are Japan, USA and Austria.  Union density and union coverage fell in all
countries, except for Austria (union density was the only one falling).  They
didn’t experience any change in their wage bargaining system, Japan and USA
staying decentralised and Austria negotiating mainly at the industry-level.  The
increases in the tax burden were also proportionally much larger before 1985 than
after.
In conclusion, this descriptive approach of the institutional frameworks gives us
an intuition of why some countries were more successful than others were.  The
reductions in the tax burden and replacement rates seem to be important
ingredients. Furthermore, the reduction in the union bargaining power is present
in most of the successful countries, combined with a deeper reform of the entire
bargaining system.  We also see that most of the successful countries changed a
lot in the same time, the two most obvious examples being The Netherlands and14
United Kingdom.  The theoretical ideas seem to be supported by the stylised facts.
In the econometric study below, we investigate more closely the mechanisms
through which success and failure happened.
4. EMPIRICAL STUDY
4.1. Previous work
Nickell (1998) constitutes a starting point to our empirical study. He considers
20 OECD countries taking averages over two time periods : 1983-8 and 1989-94.
From his analysis, he concludes that determinants of the unemployed treatment
such as the replacement rate and benefit duration increase unemployment. Active
labour market policies can to a certain extent counteract this effect.  Owner
occupation rates affect unemployment and characteristics of the wage
determination system also play a significant role. Union density and union
coverage are pushing the unemployment rate upwards. On the other hand, co-
ordination between unions and employers stimulate labour market performance.
Finally, labour taxes increase total unemployment, while none of the indicators of
labour market rigidity (employment protection regulation, labour taxes) has a
significant effect.
Scarpetta (1996) considers 15 to 17 OECD countries over the 1983-1993 period.
The explanatory variable is the OECD structural unemployment rate. The main
conclusion is that institutions matter and play an important role in the persistence
of unemployment.  In a dynamic formulation of the model Scarpetta adds
variables such as the terms of trade, assumed to play an important role in small
open economies.  For the rest, the variables taken into consideration are quite
similar to the ones used by Nickell. Scarpetta finds different results however, with
respect to labour taxes (no significant effect) and the employment protection
regulation (significant positive effect). The latter result also contrasts with Bertola
(1992) who was also unable to find any relationship between unemployment
levels and employment adjustment costs. Further, Scarpetta finds support for the
hump-shape hypothesis associated with the degree of centralisation (Calmfors and
Driffill, 1988). Interest rates and terms of trade do not have any significant effect
on long run labour market conditions. Regarding the role of institutions on the
persistence of unemployment, Scarpetta finds that generous unemployment
benefits, employment protection and high degree of unionisation reduce the
adjustment period. On the other hand, highly centralised or decentralised
economies are characterised by faster adjustments. This confirms the hump-shape
hypothesis.
Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998) extend the previous analysis by
considering a larger number of countries, taking the recent institutional
developments into account (in particular, evolutions of collective bargaining
structures and employment protection legislation) and testing the existence of
potential interactions between policies or institutional factors. The main
conclusion is that successful countries might owe their success to reforms directed15
at insiders. In particular, the tightening of eligibility conditions and the reduction
of unemployment benefits, as well as the easing up of fixed term contracts
regulation might have had a determinant influence. The authors build a new
indicator characterising the wage setting system, summarising the degree of
centralisation and the degree of co-ordination. Assuming that in countries where
the degree of centralisation is medium (negotiations mainly at the industry level),
co-ordination among actors might be particularly crucial, they upgrade countries
with medium level of centralisation and high degree of co-ordination. Elmeskov
et al. also find empirical support for the interaction effects hypothesis. First, the
average tax wedge and the employment protection regulation push the structural
unemployment rate at a higher level in countries with intermediary level of
corporatism. Further, unemployment benefits are likely to have a higher effect in
countries with relatively high levels of active labour market policy expenditures.
And it appears that the degree of employment protection does not matter for the
effect of unemployment benefits, while they would have expected the effect of
unemployment benefit to be higher in countries with high employment protection,
the bargaining power of the workers assumed to be bigger.
Finally, Daveri and Tabellini (1997) look at complementarities between labour
taxes and the nature of collective arrangements. Their analysis concerns 14
countries over the period 1965-1991. They find empirical support for a correlation
between the negative effect of labour taxes on labour market performances and
the nature of organisation of the workers. Decentralised or centralised countries
are performing better, in the sense of lower unemployment rate, irrespective of the
level of labour taxes.
Nickell and Van Ours (2000) use the results from Scarpetta (1996), Elmeskov et
al. (1998) and Nickell and Layard (1999) to indicate the quantitative impact of
institutional changes on the equilibrium unemployment rates in the Netherlands
and the UK. They conclude that much of the recent decline in equilibrium
unemployment in both countries  is due to a combination of changes in the wage
bargaining structures, the tax benefit system and active labour market policies.
4.2. Methods and assumptions
Our empirical study is based on annual data (1960-1995) for eighteen OECD
countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States of America).
The conclusion drawn in the theory section is that unemployment rate is
influenced by a set of institutional variables.  The effect of each institution is
depending on the institutional framework as a whole.  Since institutional
frameworks differ across countries and time, we cannot expect each particular
institution to have an identical effect over time and across countries. In technical
terms, that means that coefficient estimates coming from a linear regression on a
set of institutional regressors, considered separately, are probably not be16
homogenous across countries and constant over time
11.  So we can partly take the
heterogeneity between coefficients measuring the impact of various institutions
into account by explicitly setting that it depends on the other institutions.
Including complementarity coefficients can therefore be seen as an attempt to
solve the heterogeneity problem.
Concretely, we regress the standardised unemployment rate ui,t on a K of
institutional variables denoted  t i k , , c and the change in inflation denoted by  t i p ,
2 D .
We estimate the following model :
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where we allow individual effects (ai) so as to take care of the unobserved
heterogeneity.  ck and cl being institutional parameters and ei,t is an error term.
For the “traditional” component of the error term, we assume the following:
, , , 0 t i Euit " =
We also allow for country-specific coefficients, but we assume, as Swamy
(1970) that these coefficients are random draws from the following (common to
all countries) distribution, so that
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11 We test formally for homogeneity with two alternative tests : the traditional Fisher Test and
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Regarding the unobserved heterogeneity parameter ai, we can treat it as fixed or
as random. In the latter case, we will assume that:
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We have facilitated the interpretation of the complementarity coefficients by
transforming the institutional variables in their deviations from the pooled cross-
section mean.  Thanks to that formulation we can interpret the first coefficient as
the effect of a particular institutional parameter when the other parameters
considered in the complementarity variables are at their mean values.  This
interpretation facilitates the discussion the results.
4.3. Estimation results
Regression results are summarised in Table 6. We run both between and within
regressions, and the main conclusion is that between estimates are overall not
significant, while we get some interesting indications from the within-estimates.
The alternative Leamer Test (1978) even enables us to accept most of the time the
null hypothesis of coefficient homogeneity between countries. To investigate the
sensitivity of our estimation results, we run regressions including successively
complementarities with a particular institution.
In column (1), we consider a model with institutions treated independently.
Both tests (Fisher and Leamer) reject the null hypothesis of coefficient
homogeneity.  This confirms our intuition that interactions between institutions
should be considered. Indeed, coefficient homogeneity is not rejected with a
Leamer test when running a regression including all complementarity variables
(column 8).
In column (2), we present within-estimates including complementarity variables
related to the tax rate. It seems that, at the average levels of the replacement rate,
the degree of strictness in the employment regulation, the union coverage and the
degree of co-ordination, the tax rate has a positive significant effect.  If on the
other hand these latter variables are different from their mean levels, additional
interaction effects appear. Hence, a relatively strict employment regulation more
than counteracts the positive effect of the tax rate. In theory, the interaction
effects of employment regulation (firing costs) with respect to the other
parameters was ambiguous. Empirically, it seems that the effect on the bargaining18
power of the worker (where the firing cost acts as a substitute for wage
compensation) dominates the effect on the labour demand (where the firing cost
was acting as a production cost).  Furthermore, high union co-ordination and high
union coverage have complementary effects to the tax rate. Both variables proxy
the number of unions n in the theoretical model. The higher they are, the lower
would be the number of unions in our model (high degree of centralisation). We
therefore observe what we theoretically expected, i.e. a low number of unions
increase the positive effect of the tax rate. It also means that reforms aimed at
increasing the co-ordination and the union coverage would enhance the
effectiveness of a tax reform. Finally, we observe a significant positive interaction
between the replacement rate and the tax rate. This is opposite to what we would
expect in theory. The reason for a positive interaction between the replacement
rate and the tax rate probably lies in other mechanisms. The introduction of a
social security budget constraint would maybe be enlightening. A reduction in the
replacement rate would then be coupled to a reduction in the tax rate and that
would be the way they reinforce each other.
In column (3), we consider complementarities with respect to the replacement
rate.  As for the tax rate, we can draw the same kind of interpretation for the
independent coefficient. Employment regulation (firing costs) is also reducing the
effect of the tax rate. A high co-ordination (low n) reinforces the effect of the
replacement rate, as expected by the theory.
In column (4), we study complementarities with respect to the employment
regulation. We suggested already that the (negative) effect of the firing cost on the
bargaining position of the worker was dominating the one on the labour demand.
Indeed, we observe that the effect of employment regulation when all the other
parameters are a their mean levels is significantly negative. Furthermore, this
negative effect is enhanced by high taxes and counteracted by a high union
coverage. We indeed expected in theory that in the case where the effect on the
bargaining position would be dominating, the effect of employment protection
would be larger when the other parameters are high (here namely high n implies
low union coverage), which appears to be completely confirmed by our
estimations.
In column (5), we regard complementarities related to an indicator of the union
bargaining power, the union density.   Union density has a positive significant
effect when all the other institutional variables are at their mean levels.
Again, we find that the effect of one parameter reinforcing the bargaining
position of the worker is harmed by the presence of other institutions. Hence a
high level of taxes reduces the positive effect of union density. A strict
employment protection harms the bargaining position of the worker and therefore
reinforce the marginal effect of union density. These two interactions correspond
to the theory. Furthermore, a high level of co-ordination also reduces the positive
effect of union density. This is also confirming the theory since we expected that
a low number of unions (here proxied by a high level of co-ordination) would
reduce the effect of union bargaining poser (here proxied by union density).
In column (6), we present the estimations including complementarity variables
relative to the union coverage. High union coverage reduces the unemployment
rate when the other parameters are at their mean levels. In addition to the19
complementarities already discussed, we find that the marginal effect of union
coverage is increased by co-ordination.
In column (7), we consider complementarities related to the level of co-
ordination between the bargaining actors. The independent effect of co-ordination
is not significant. Complementarity variables offer however new insights.
Coordination would indeed have a negative effect when taxes and union density
are relatively high, i.e. when the worker’s bargaining position is quite good.  This
situation would also correspond to the point where coordination actually makes
sense.
Finally, in column (8), we present a regression with all complementarity
variables included.  The conclusions drawn in the previous paragraphs are hardly
affected. To evaluate the predictive power of our model including all
complementarity variables, we compare its average performance with the one of a
model including independent variables only. The average performance is simply
the average of the discrepancies between predicted change and actual change, in
absolute terms. Results are presented in Table 7. We find that the model including
all complementaritiy variables perform much better on average than the one
excluding them. The average absolute error is 1.8 percentage points for the former
and 2.4 percentage points for the latter
12.
In conclusion, we find evidence of interesting complementarities between
variables. Parameters affecting the bargaining position of the worker like low
union coverage, high replacement rates, low co-ordination, high union density and
flexible employment protection reduce the effectiveness of reforms. Furthermore,
taxes also seem to reduce the effectiveness of numerous reforms, except for the
replacement rate. The explanation could lie in the existence of a direct
relationship between them (like via a social security budget constraint). Finally,
we found that the employment protection was more acting as a substitute for wage
compensation than as a cost falling on labour demand.
4.4. Simulations
In this section, we focus on the recent evolution of OECD countries, i.e. the part
on what we based our classification of countries into three groups, successful,
unsuccessful and stable. Our objective is twofold. First, we test the explanatory
power of our model including all complementary variables (column (8)) versus a
model including only independent variables (column (1)). Second, we investigate
the sources of success and failure in unemployment histories. Two elements play
a key role in the evolution of unemployment. First, the initial institutional setting
determines the effect of the policies and reforms that are implemented. Second,
the policies and reforms implemented interact with each other. In the analysis
below, we propose therefore a distinction between “initiation situation” and
“policy interaction” effects.
                                               
12 From a rank correlation test it appears that there is a significant correlation between the
predictions from the model in column (8) of Table 6 and the changes in actual unemployment
rates. There is no significant correlation between the predictions from the model in column (1) of
Table 6 and the changes in actual unemployment rates.20
We now turn to the unemployment histories. The empirical analysis includes six
institutional parameters: labour tax rate, replacement rate, degree of employment
protection, union density, union coverage index and co-ordination index. We
consider two points (smoothed) in time: T and T+1. The estimated unemployment
rates in these two points are:
( )( ) ￿ ￿ ￿
= = £





.. , , .. 1 , , 1 , , 1 ,
2
1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
k k k l
l t i l k T i k kl T i k ik T i i i T p u c c c c g c g D b a , (4.19)
( )( ) ￿ ￿ ￿
= = £





.. , , .. , , , , ,
2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
k k k l
l t i l k T i k kl T i k ik T i i i T p u c c c c g c g D b a , (4.20)
and consequently, the predicted change in unemployment rate is:
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   The evolution of the unemployment rate is decomposed in three parts (4.21).
The first part measures the effect of the acceleration in inflation. The second part
measures the direct effects of changes in institutional parameters, i.e. the
predicted effect of a change in an institutional parameter when the rest of the
institutional framework is at the overall mean level. The third and last part
measures the interaction effects. The latter can also be decomposed in two
elements. The first element translates the effect of the “initial condition”, i.e. the
additional effect coming from the fact that the institutions of the country are not at
the overall mean level. The second element reflects policy interactions, i.e. the
effect coming from the particular combination of reforms implemented during the
period considered. We detail in Table 8 the results of our predictions.
A first striking element is the heterogeneity in stories. The first group of
countries was unsuccessful for various reasons. Some countries like Belgium and
Switzerland implemented damaging policies. In Belgium, the poor labour market
performance is mainly due to the increase in the labour tax rate together with the
rise in union density. Switzerland also suffered from the increase in the labour tax
rate, especially since it was combined with a reinforcement of the replacement
rate. Furthermore, its union coverage went down. All these three factors
comforted the worker’s bargaining position and pushed the unemployment rate
up.
Germany, Italy and Sweden rather suffered from the negative interactions
between the policies implemented and the initial institutional setting. The German
institutional setting was such that the bargaining position of the workers was
strong, so that the reforms were less effective. Swedish institutional setting, on the
other hand, was “favourable”, in the sense that the bargaining position of the
worker was weak, but the reforms were wrong, i.e. their direct effect pushed the
unemployment rate upwards. The Italian situation was somewhere in between the
Germand and the Swedish ones.21
France, and to a smaller extent Italy, owe their failure to the combinations of
policies implemented during the period considered. The combination of reforms
lead in France lead to an estimated increase of 4.21 percentage points in the
unemployment rate. The increases in both the tax rate and the replacement rate
and the fall in the employment protection moderated strongly the effects of the
fall in union density and the increase in union coverage.
Among the successful countries, the Netherlands and Ireland obviously
implemented the “good” reforms. The direct effect of these reforms is the main
part of the story but they also designed their reforms well, given their initial
institutional settings. The evolution in United Kingdom is harder to understand,
since the reforms implemented were not exploiting institutional
complementarities.
Among the stable countries, we find Canada, Japan and United States which
somehow benefited from their institutional setting to moderate the damaging
effects of the policies implemented. Austria, on the other hand, couldn’t benefit
from the reforms implemented (that had a direct negative effect) because of the
strong bargaining position of the worker.
In conclusion, these simulations show how the unemployment histories can
diverge. Two elements seem crucial. First, the nature of the reforms implemented
and second, the way it is amplified or moderated by the rest of the institutional
framework. The ideal reform combines a negative direct effect and the
exploitation of complementarities in the institutional framework. Some countries,
where the bargaining position of the worker is quite strong will probably have to
do more efforts to reach the success than some others, benefiting from a
favourable institutional framework.
5. CONCLUSION
There is an obvious difference in labour market performance between OECD
countries in particular in terms of the evolution of unemployment rates. For some
countries apart from cyclical fluctuations unemployment rates have been rather
constant in the past decades. However, most of the countries have experienced a
rapid increase in unemployment rates in the beginning of the 1980s. Some of
these countries have had a high unemployment rate since, but other countries have
managed to bring unemployment rates down substantially.  The main question we
address in this paper is to what extent labour market reforms have been an
important determinant of the evolution in unemployment rates. We are especially
interested in the question whether particular combinations of labour market
reforms were more successful than others. We investigate the relationship
between unemployment rate and labour market institutions such as tax rate,
replacement rate, employment protection, union density, union coverage, co-
ordination in bargaining. Since we are interested in potential complementarities in
institutions and institutional changes we investigate both the direct effects of
institutions and interactions between them. Our empirical analysis shows that
indeed interaction effects are important. If for example labour taxes are reduced
this has a larger negative effect on unemployment if the replacement rate, union22
coverage and coordination in bargaining is high and if union density and
employment protection is low. Lowering the replacement rate is more effective if
the tax rate and union density are higher and union coverage is lower.
Our main conclusion is twofold. First, for most countries interaction effects
enforce direct effects and for some countries interaction effects are more
important than direct effects. Second, for most countries it is the effect of
financial incentives (tax rate and replacement rate) that is driving the direction in
which the unemployment rate moves. If financial incentives have been enforced
unemployment was lowered, if financial incentives have been weakened
unemployment deteriorated. All in all, we conclude that there is a clear
relationship between unemployment and particular combinations of labour market
reforms.
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Table 1: Standardised unemployment rates in OECD countries
1960 1970 1980 1985 1990 1993 1996 Mean Stdev
BEL 3.3 1.9 8.1 12.6 8.9 8.9 9.7 6.9 4.1
CHE 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.5 3.8 3.5 1.0 1.3
DEU 1.0 0.6 3.2 8.1 6.3 7.9 9.0 4.5 3.3
FIN 1.4 1.9 4.7 5.0 3.5 17.6 16.1 6.0 4.9
FRA 1.5 2.5 6.4 10.5 9.1 11.7 12.3 6.6 4.3
ITA 6.5 5.5 7.7 10.4 11.5 10.3 12.0 8.4 2.9
SWE 1.7 1.5 2.0 2.8 1.7 9.5 10.0 3.5 2.9
AUS 1.4 1.4 5.9 7.9 7.0 11.0 8.6 5.5 3.2
DEN 2.3 0.7 6.9 7.3 8.4 10.1 6.0 5.3 3.4
GBR 1.4 2.2 5.7 11.6 5.5 10.5 8.2 5.8 3.6
IRL 5.6 5.9 7.4 17.6 13.8 15.6 11.9 9.9 4.7
NLD 1.5 1.5 6.2 11.1 7.6 6.6 6.3 5.5 3.5
NZL 0.1 0.1 2.2 4.2 7.8 9.5 6.1 3.3 3.4
AUT 2.6 1.4 1.9 3.6 3.2 4.0 4.4 2.9 1.4
CAN 6.5 5.7 7.5 10.5 8.1 11.2 9.7 7.7 2.3
JPN 1.7 1.1 2.0 2.6 2.1 2.5 3.4 2.1 0.7
NOR 1.2 0.8 1.7 2.6 5.3 6.1 4.9 2.7 1.7
USA 5.5 4.9 7.1 7.2 5.5 6.9 5.3 6.0 1.3
Mean 2.5 2.2 4.8 7.6 6.4 9.1 8.2
Std dev 2.1 1.9 2.6 4.4 3.4 3.9 3.526
 Table 2: Averages in unemployment rates and institutions (standard errors)
BEL 6.9 ( 4.1 ) 46.6 ( 17.3 ) 41.3 ( 3.9 ) 0.7 ( 0.1 ) 2.0 ( 0.0 ) 2.0 ( 0.0 ) 90.0 ( 0.0 ) 50.7 ( 3.9 )
CHE 1.0 ( 1.3 ) 31.6 ( 14.7 ) 12.7 ( 9.1 ) 0.1 ( 0.0 ) 2.0 ( 0.0 ) 2.0 ( 0.0 ) 52.0 ( 1.0 ) 29.1 ( 1.5 )
DEU 4.5 ( 3.3 ) 45.5 ( 7.6 ) 28.8 ( 1.0 ) 0.7 ( 0.2 ) 2.0 ( 0.0 ) 3.0 ( 0.0 ) 88.4 ( 3.1 ) 33.0 ( 2.2 )
FIN 6.0 ( 4.9 ) 51.8 ( 17.3 ) 15.4 ( 8.7 ) 0.7 ( 0.2 ) 2.6 ( 0.5 ) 2.0 ( 0.0 ) 95.0 ( 0.0 ) 65.0 ( 11.4 )
FRA 6.6 ( 4.3 ) 43.6 ( 9.5 ) 29.7 ( 6.9 ) 0.6 ( 0.3 ) 2.0 ( 0.0 ) 2.0 ( 0.0 ) 88.0 ( 4.1 ) 16.5 ( 5.7 )
ITA 8.4 ( 2.9 ) 46.7 ( 9.4 ) 1.9 ( 1.0 ) 0.8 ( 0.1 ) 1.4 ( 0.8 ) 2.2 ( 0.4 ) 75.4 ( 9.6 ) 40.2 ( 3.9 )
SWE 3.5 ( 2.9 ) 53.9 ( 27.1 ) 3.8 ( 3.4 ) 1.0 ( 0.1 ) 2.8 ( 0.4 ) 2.8 ( 0.4 ) 81.5 ( 6.7 ) 77.4 ( 11.2 )
AUS 5.5 ( 3.2 ) 16.8 ( 4.9 ) 21.9 ( 4.5 ) 0.1 ( 0.1 ) 1.7 ( 0.5 ) 1.7 ( 0.5 ) 85.7 ( 5.0 ) 44.8 ( 5.7 )
DEN 5.3 ( 3.4 ) 30.8 ( 13.8 ) 50.5 ( 16.8 ) 0.3 ( 0.2 ) 2.5 ( 0.5 ) 3.0 ( 0.0 ) 69.0 ( 0.0 ) 68.5 ( 7.4 )
IRL 9.9 ( 4.7 ) 16.6 ( 8.1 ) 24.5 ( 5.4 ) 0.1 ( 0.0 ) 2.0 ( 0.0 ) 2.3 ( 0.5 ) 85.0 ( 0.0 ) 52.8 ( 2.3 )
GBR 5.8 ( 3.6 ) 29.0 ( 8.9 ) 22.9 ( 3.2 ) 0.2 ( 0.0 ) 1.7 ( 0.5 ) 1.0 ( 0.0 ) 58.8 ( 8.6 ) 42.1 ( 5.3 )
NLD 5.5 ( 3.5 ) 48.1 ( 21.6 ) 39.3 ( 14.2 ) 0.4 ( 0.1 ) 2.0 ( 0.0 ) 2.5 ( 0.5 ) 75.8 ( 2.4 ) 32.5 ( 5.7 )
NZL 3.3 ( 3.4 ) 10.0 ( 12.5 ) 29.6 ( 2.3 ) 0.3 ( 0.0 ) 1.8 ( 0.4 ) 1.0 ( 0.0 ) 60.3 ( 13.4 ) 49.5 ( 9.8 )
AUS 2.9 ( 1.4 ) 42.4 ( 5.8 ) 19.4 ( 11.1 ) 0.4 ( 0.0 ) 2.0 ( 0.0 ) 3.0 ( 0.0 ) 98.0 ( 0.0 ) 54.1 ( 8.1 )
CAN 7.7 ( 2.3 ) 25.1 ( 9.7 ) 26.1 ( 2.9 ) 0.1 ( 0.0 ) 1.0 ( 0.0 ) 1.0 ( 0.0 ) 34.9 ( 2.5 ) 33.8 ( 3.4 )
JPN 2.1 ( 0.7 ) 20.2 ( 8.7 ) 10.8 ( 1.5 ) 0.6 ( 0.1 ) 1.0 ( 0.0 ) 3.0 ( 0.0 ) 27.2 ( 4.3 ) 30.3 ( 4.6 )
NOR 2.7 ( 1.7 ) 32.4 ( 19.7 ) 20.3 ( 15.9 ) 0.6 ( 0.2 ) 3.0 ( 0.0 ) 3.0 ( 0.0 ) 71.3 ( 4.1 ) 56.4 ( 1.3 )
USA 6.0 ( 1.3 ) 29.1 ( 13.1 ) 11.5 ( 2.0 ) 0.0 ( 0.0 ) 1.0 ( 0.0 ) 1.0 ( 0.0 ) 24.7 ( 5.3 ) 21.1 ( 4.1 )
Union Coverage Union Density Empl.regulation Centralisation Co-ordination Unempl. Rate (%)  Tax Burden (%) Repl. Rate (%)27
Table 3: Absolute changes in unemployment rates and institutions: Group of unsuccessful countries
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UR (level) UR(%) TER(%) TEE(%) TAX(%) RR(%) EP FT TWAERTOT CEN COO UC UD
BEL 1960 3.3
BEL 1975 4.6 1.3 9.7 8.0 17.7 5.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.2
BEL 1996 9.7 5.1 7.4 1.3 8.7 -8.0 0.1 -1.1 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3
CHE 1960 0.0
CHE 1992 2.6 2.5 3.5 8.9 12.4 16.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -3.1
CHE 1996 3.5 0.9 0.9 1.5 2.4 8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.5 0.0
DEU 1961 0.7
DEU 1975 4.0 3.3 4.9 4.1 9.1 -1.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 3.3 1.2
DEU 1996 9.0 5.0 2.3 1.0 3.3 -2.0 0.0 -1.1 -0.1 -0.4 0.0 0.0 4.3 -5.5
FIN 1960 1.4
FIN 1977 5.9 4.5 12.9 12.9 25.8 22.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.9
FIN 1992 13.2 7.2 2.9 0.5 3.5 -5.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0 11.3
FIN 1996 16.1 2.9 2.0 3.4 5.3 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.4
FRA 1960 1.5
FRA 1975 4.1 2.7 9.2 1.4 10.6 -2.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.4
FRA 1996 12.3 8.2 6.6 7.1 13.7 14.0 0.0 -1.3 0.0 -0.4 0.0 0.0 10.0 -10.9
ITA 1960 6.5
ITA 1996 12.0 5.5 7.6 9.4 17.0 1.0 0.3 -0.6 0.0 -0.1 2.0 1.0 19.4 2.7
SWE 1960 1.7
SWE 1992 5.3 3.5 30.3 0.9 31.1 6.5 0.0 -0.5 0.0 -0.2 -1.0 -1.0 14.4 30.2
SWE 1996 10.0 4.7 0.2 0.7 0.9 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.5
                                               
13 For the replacement rates, we refer to the year 1961 instead of 1960. When data were missing in 1996, we use the last year available (1994 or 1995).28
Table 4: Absolute changes in unemployment rates and institutions: Successful countries
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UR (level) UR(%) TER(%) TEE(%) TAX(%) RR(%) EP FT TWAERTOT CEN COO UC UD
AUS 1960 1.4
AUS 1975 4.6 3.1 1.5 6.0 7.4 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -4.3 -0.2
AUS 1993 11.0 6.4 -2.8 -0.8 -3.6 5.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.3 -1.0 -1.0 -7.5 -13.9
AUS 1996 8.6 -2.4 6.0 0.3 6.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3
DEN 1960 2.3
DEN 1974 3.6 1.3 0.1 17.9 17.9 31.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1
DEN 1983 11.6 7.9 1.0 -0.1 0.9 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0 13.1
DEN 1987 5.4 -6.1 0.1 1.2 1.3 -4.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.8
DEN 1993 10.1 4.7 -1.1 -0.6 -1.7 21.0 0.0 0.0 -2.0 -0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2
DEN 1996 6.0 -4.1 ? ? -2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
GBR 1960 1.4
GBR 1977 5.3 3.9 8.0 5.8 13.8 1.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 5.6 8.6
GBR 1986 11.8 6.5 -0.5 -2.2 -2.7 -5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -14.5 -4.5
GBR 1996 8.2 -3.6 -1.1 -1.0 -2.1 -2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.0 0.0 -7.7 -10.4
IRE 1960 5.6
IRE 1976 9.1 3.5 4.1 7.2 11.3 8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3
IRE 1987 17.8 8.7 1.5 5.5 7.1 6.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -3.5
IRE 1996 11.9 -5.9 0.3 -0.6 -0.3 -4.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 -1.9
NLD 1960 1.5
NLD 1975 5.3 3.8 13.5 5.5 19.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.3
NLD 1984 12.2 6.9 1.4 0.8 2.2 17.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 -1.5 -6.7
NLD 1996 6.3 -5.9 -14.3 7.5 -6.8 -5.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 7.0 -4.0
NZL 1960 0.1
NZL 1983 5.7 5.6 0.5 22.5 23.0 -11.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -3.1
NZL 1992 10.3 4.7 -1.6 -1.7 -3.3 -1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.0 0.0 -18.0 -13.1
NZL 1996 6.1 -4.2 0.0 -20.8 -20.8 -3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -18.0 -9.9
                                               
14 For the replacement rates, we refer to the year 1961 instead of 1960. When data were missing in 1996, we use the last year available (1994 or 1995).29
Table 5: Absolute changes in unemployment rates and institutions between important date points
Groups of stable countries
15
UR (level) UR(%) TER(%) TEE(%) TAX(%) RR(%) EP FT TWAERTOT CEN COO UC UD
AUT 1960 2.6
AUT 1985 3.6 1.0 7.7 7.4 15.1 28.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -11.0
AUT 1996 4.4 0.8 0.4 -3.2 -2.8 -3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -9.2
CAN 1960 6.5
CAN 1982 11.0 4.5 4.9 8.2 13.1 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.4 6.8
CAN 1996 9.7 -1.3 5.5 1.7 7.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.2 2.0
JPN 1960 1.7
JPN 1985 2.6 1.5 6.2 4.0 10.2 -2.0 0.3 0.0 -1.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -6.2 -6.8
JPN 1996 3.4 0.8 0.7 1.4 2.0 -9.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -4.4 -4.3
NOR 1960 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
NOR 1989 5.0 3.8 11.8 1.8 13.7 35.0 0.0 -1.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 9.1 -0.2
NOR 1996 4.9 -0.1 0.0 -0.4 -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.0 1.9
USA 1960 5.5
USA 1985 7.2 1.7 11.4 2.8 14.1 8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -8.3 -6.3
USA 1996 5.3 -1.9 1.6 0.3 1.9 -3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -4.0 -3.0
                                               
15 For the replacement rates, we refer to the year 1961 instead of 1960. When data were missing in 1996, we use the last year available (1994 or 1995).30
Table 6: Estimation Results (I)
Driving macro variable
change in inflation -0.23 ( 0.04 ) -0.21 ( 0.03 ) -0.22 ( 0.04 ) -0.22 ( 0.04 )
Independent institutions
tax rate (0-1) 0.27 ( 0.02 ) 0.32 ( 0.02 ) 0.31 ( 0.02 ) 0.27 ( 0.02 )
replacement rate (0-1) 0.06 ( 0.02 ) 0.00 ( 0.02 ) 0.00 ( 0.02 ) 0.04 ( 0.02 )
employment protection (total) (0-1) -0.04 ( 0.02 ) 0.00 ( 0.02 ) 0.00 ( 0.02 ) -0.06 ( 0.02 )
union density (0-1) 0.00 ( 0.02 ) 0.07 ( 0.03 ) 0.00 ( 0.02 ) 0.00 ( 0.02 )
union coverage (0-1) -0.07 ( 0.03 ) -0.06 ( 0.03 ) 0.00 ( 0.03 ) 0.00 ( 0.03 )
coordination index (1/2/3) 0.00 ( 0.00 ) 0.00 ( 0.00 ) 0.00 ( 0.00 ) 0.00 ( 0.00 )
Complementarities*
tax * rr 0.51 ( 0.11 ) 0.75 ( 0.10 )
tax * ertot -0.52 ( 0.07 ) -0.29 ( 0.05 )
tax * ud -0.09 ( 0.11 )
tax * uc 0.64 ( 0.07 )
tax * coo 0.04 ( 0.02 )
rr * ertot -0.33 ( 0.06 )
rr * ud
rr * uc
rr * coo 0.06 ( 0.02 )
ertot * ud






Hausman test of Ho : RE vs. FE (p-value)
F-Test of Ho :a.b vs ai.bi (p-value)
F-Test of Ho:ai.b vs ai.bi (p-value)














Dependent variable : Standardised Unemployment Rate (%)
0.65






(i) all regressions contain country fixed effects
(ii) tax : tax rate; rr : replacement rate; ertot : employment protection regulation;
uc : union coverage, ud : union density; coo : coordination index
(iii) Fisher test (a,b=ai,b) : test for the presence of individual effects (intercepts);
Fisher test (ai,b=ai,bi) : test for coefficient homogeneity, assuming individual
intercepts), Leamer alternative critical value : Fcrit=(T-k)/p(T^p/T-1), where
T=total number of observations, k=number of estimated parameters in the
unrestricted model and p=number of restrictions.
(iv) In bold : Values significant at 5% level; into brackets :standard errors
(v) Number of observations : 59131
Table 6: Estimation Results (II)
Driving macro variable
change in inflation -0.22 ( 0.04 ) -0.22 ( 0.03 ) -0.22 ( 0.04 ) -0.19 ( 0.03 )
Independent institutions
tax rate (0-1) 0.28 ( 0.02 ) 0.28 ( 0.02 ) 0.29 ( 0.02 ) 0.29 ( 0.02 )
replacement rate (0-1) 0.04 ( 0.01 ) 0.05 ( 0.01 ) 0.02 ( 0.02 ) 0.00 ( 0.02 )
employment protection (total) (0-1) -0.03 ( 0.02 ) -0.10 ( 0.02 ) -0.06 ( 0.02 ) 0.00 ( 0.02 )
union density (0-1) 0.14 ( 0.03 ) 0.11 ( 0.03 ) 0.04 ( 0.02 ) 0.16 ( 0.03 )
union coverage (0-1) -0.19 ( 0.03 ) -0.31 ( 0.04 ) -0.07 ( 0.03 ) -0.22 ( 0.03 )
coordination index (1/2/3) 0.01 ( 0.00 ) 0.02 ( 0.01 ) 0.00 ( 0.00 ) 0.00 ( 0.00 )
Complementarities*
tax * rr 0.66 ( 0.11 )
tax * ertot -0.51 ( 0.08 )
tax * ud -0.21 ( 0.09 ) -0.32 ( 0.11 )
tax * uc 0.45 ( 0.08 ) 0.64 ( 0.09 )
tax * coo -0.07 ( 0.02 ) 0.09 ( 0.03 )
rr * ertot
rr * ud 0.17 ( 0.08 )
rr * uc -0.30 ( 0.09 ) -0.40 ( 0.09 )
rr * coo 0.07 ( 0.02 )
ertot * ud 0.32 ( 0.06 ) 0.46 ( 0.07 )
ertot * uc 0.61 ( 0.08 ) 0.33 ( 0.08 ) 0.21 ( 0.07 )
ertot * coo 0.06 ( 0.02 ) -0.04 ( 0.02 )
ud * uc -0.67 ( 0.09 ) -0.42 ( 0.10 )
ud * coo -0.08 ( 0.02 ) -0.08 ( 0.02 )
uc * coo -0.09 ( 0.03 ) -0.11 ( 0.02 )
Constant term
Adjusted R-squared
Hausman test of Ho : RE vs. FE (p-value)
F-Test of Ho :a.b vs ai.bi (p-value)
F-Test of Ho:ai.b vs ai.bi (p-value)




















(i) all regressions contain country fixed effects
(ii) tax : tax rate; rr : replacement rate; ertot : employment protection regulation;
uc : union coverage, ud : union density; coo : coordination index
(iii) Fisher test (a,b=ai,b) : test for the presence of individual effects (intercepts);
Fisher test (ai,b=ai,bi) : test for coefficient homogeneity, assuming individual
intercepts), Leamer alternative critical value : Fcrit=(T-k)/p(T^p/T-1), where
T=total number of observations, k=number of estimated parameters in the
unrestricted model and p=number of restrictions.
(iv) In bold : Values significant at 5% level; into brackets :standard errors
(v) Number of observations : 59132
Table 7: Prediction power of models (1) and (8)
Country Predicted (1) Predicted (8) Actual Model (1) Model (2)
BEL 3.1 3.1 5.3 2.2 2.2
CHE 1.9 2.8 2.2 0.3 0.6
DEU 1.7 2.2 5.8 4.0 3.6
FIN -0.3 0.4 4.2 4.5 3.8
FRA 5.2 7.8 8.7 3.5 0.9
ITA 3.5 3.9 5.3 1.8 1.3
SWE -0.8 2.0 6.2 7.0 4.2
GBR -0.1 0.5 -1.7 1.6 2.2
IRL -0.5 -1.1 -2.3 1.7 1.2
NLD -3.2 -5.5 -4.8 1.6 0.6
AUT -0.5 -0.8 0.7 1.2 1.5
CAN 1.6 1.4 0.2 1.4 1.2
JPN 1.3 -0.4 0.1 1.1 0.6
NOR -0.9 -0.5 1.0 1.9 1.5
USA 0.9 0.1 -1.0 1.9 1.1
Average 2.4 1.8
Changes Errors33
Table 8: Simulation results
Total
Policy interaction
tax rr ep ud uc coo total tax rr ep ud uc coo total total
BEL 1975-1994 4.5 3.1 0.2 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 3.6 -0.5 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.3
CHE 1991-1994 2.2 2.8 0.2 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.7 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.7 0.2
DEU 1974-1994 5.8 2.2 0.2 1.3 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -1.0 0.0 -0.3 0.1 0.0 1.0 -0.3 0.7 0.0 1.5 0.8
FIN 1992-1995 4.2 0.4 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0
FRA 1974-1994 8.7 7.8 0.4 4.1 0.0 0.0 -1.9 -1.9 0.0 0.3 0.1 -0.6 2.0 -0.6 2.0 0.0 2.8 4.2
ITA 1974-1994 5.3 3.9 0.7 3.4 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -2.8 0.0 0.3 -2.4 0.2 0.6 -0.1 3.6 -0.3 1.7 1.3
SWE 1991-1993 6.2 2.0 -0.3 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.9 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 1.1 2.0 0.2
GBR 1986-1994 -1.7 0.5 0.0 -0.7 0.0 0.0 -1.6 2.1 0.0 -0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.0 1.0 -0.3
IRL 1987-1990 -2.3 -1.1 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.2 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 -0.6 -0.3 0.0
NLD 1984-1994 -4.8 -5.5 -0.1 -3.0 0.0 0.0 -0.8 -0.9 0.0 -4.7 -1.4 -0.4 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.0 -0.6 -0.1
AUT 1985-1995 0.7 -0.8 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.0 -1.5 0.0 0.0 -2.0 -0.4 0.1 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0
CAN 1982-1994 0.2 1.4 -0.3 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 2.5 -0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.8 0.0
JPN 1985-1994 0.1 -0.4 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 -0.7 0.9 0.0 1.0 -0.6 0.0 0.7 -1.1 -0.5 0.0 -1.6 0.1
NOR 1989-1994 1.0 -0.5 -0.3 -0.7 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
USA 1985-1994 -1.0 0.1 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 -0.6 1.1 0.0 1.3 -0.3 -0.4 0.0 0.1 -0.4 0.0 -0.9 -0.2







APPENDIX 1 : THE BARGAINING SOLUTION
The bargaining program can be written as follows:
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where the first order condition can be written as follows :
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The first term of the first order condition can therefore be written as follows:
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The first term on the right hand side can easily be simplified and collapses to the




















where  ) 1 ( 1 h a m - - = .
We then get the following expression:
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and we get the following expression for the first term of the left hand side Nash
bargaining condition :
.
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b be b (A.9)
We now turn to the second term on the left-hand side of the Nash bargaining
program first order condition.
The firm union rents were defined as follows:
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The first-order condition of the Nash bargaining program can be re-written as:
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We compute the general equilibrium level by applying the symmetry assumption
so that 
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where ck=1,...K are institutional parameters.












































L n t . (A.22)
For n>1, the following holds  0     , 0     , 0     , 0     , 0
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APPENDIX 2: DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES
Change in inflation: Absolute annual change in inflation, the latter defined as the
relative increase in consumer prices. Source: Consumer price index, Luxembourg
Income Study
Tax rate (%): Employment tax rate + Direct tax rate
Employment tax rate (%) : Indicator previously computed by the Centre for
Economic Performance (London School of Economics), defined as the ratio between
the sum of employers’contributions to social security contributions and contributions
to private pension schemes (when applicable) and the compensation of employees
net of these contributions. Source: CEP (1960-1992), OECD, National Accounts
(1993-1996)
Direct tax rate (%) : Indicator previously computed by the Centre for Economic
Performance (London School of Economics), defined as the ratio between the sum
of households’contributions to social security net the employers’contributions and
the income taxes, and the households’current receipts. Source: CEP (1960-1992),
OECD, National Accounts (1993-1996)
Replacement rate (%) : Ratio between the unemployment benefit and the median
wage. The indicator used for the unemployment benefit is a summary indicator,
taking into account various durations and family situations. The ratio has been
directly computed by OECD. Only odd years were available. We have computed
even years by linear interpolation
Employment regulation: Built index indicating the strictness of employment
regulation with respect to open-ended contracts, fixed-term (FT) contracts and
temporary work agencies (TWA). See appendix (A.5)
Centralisation index: Index (1-3) characterising the degree of centralisation of the
collective bargaining system, according to the privileged level of bargaining: 1:firm
level, 2:industry level, 3:national level. Source: Bratt (1996), OECD, Employment
Outlook (1997), Elmeskov et al. (1997)
Coordination index: Index (1-3) characterising the degree of consensus between
the actors in the collective bargaining system. 1: low, 2:medium, 3:high. Source:
Bratt(1996), OECD, Employment Outlook (1997), Elmeskov et al. (1997)
Union density (%): union density using OECD data, Bain & Price, Van
Ruysseveldt, Visser
Union coverage index: union coverage, some observations interpolated, and using
union density/coverage ratios, source : OECD39
APPENDIX 3: KEY FOR THE BUIDING OF THE EMPLOYMENT
PROTECTION INDICATOR
PROTECTION OF OPEN-ENDED CONTRACTS
Administrative procedure :
These marks are just added up according to the presence of the mentionned factors.
1 – Notification required (verbally or by letter)
1 – Grounds notification required (verbally or by letter)
1 – Notification to a third party required
1 – Authorisation of a third party
Noticing period:
0 – No notification period required
1 – < 2 months
2 - > 2 months
Severance payment:
0 – No notification period required
1 – < 2 months
2 - > 2 months
Special provisions:
1 – Tighter protection of special categories of workers
2 – Companies must provide retraining courses
Definition of unfair dismissals (and provisions with respect to it)
0 – Discrimination and no economic grounds
1 – when social considerations haven’t been taken into account
1 – when discrimination in the selection procedure of dismissals
1 – when no consultation with the workforce has been undertaken
2 – when re-training the labour force must be attempted
3 – when worker capability cannot be a basis for dismissal
-1 – when a ceiling apply to appeal against unfair dismissal
Collective dismissals (special provisions) :
1 – Conciliation with workforce / third party required
1 – redundancies must be accompanied by a social plan
2 – authorisation of a third party required
2 – when specific conditions must be fulfilled40
REGULATION OF FIXED TERM CONTRACTS
Purpose:
0 – No limit
1 – Specific restrictions (some jobs ore sectors are excluded)
2 – Particular circumstances (increase in the amount of work, temporary
replacement of a worker)
2 – Wide restrictions (limited to some jobs or sectors)
3 – Objective reasons (task temporary in nature)
4 – Not allowed
-1 – If can be used for unemployed and apprentices (if restrictions exist otherwise)
Duration:
0 – No limit
1 – Limited to 1 year, only few renewals possible
2 - no renewal possible
TEMPORARY WORK AGENCIES REGULATION
Purpose:
0 – No limit
1 – Specific restrictions (some jobs ore sectors are excluded)
2 – Particular circumstances (increase in the amount of work, temporary
replacement of a worker)
2 – Wide restrictions (limited to some jobs or sectors)
3 – Objective reasons (task temporary in nature)
4 – Not allowed
-1 – If can be used for unemployed and apprentices (if restrictions exist otherwise)
Duration:
0 – No limit
1 – Limited to 1 year, only few renewals possible
2 - no renewal possible
We graded the evolution of the employment regulation for all the countries, over the
period 1960-1996
16. We then calculated three indicators, averaging the grades
related to each component described above. We normalised the highest value for
each indicator to 1, so as to re-scale our indicators in a range [0,1]. We then
                                               
16 Full description of the evolution and the data are available from the authors upon
request.41
calculated the average of the three indicators to obtain the summary index of
employment protection regulation.